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THE DIACHRONIC SELF

Identity, Continuity, Transformation

Max More

December 1995

PART 1: REDUCTIONISM, CAUSE, AND IDENTITY

Ch.1: Causal Conditions for Continuity

Diachronic Identity: A relational view. Self and self-phase.
Four Theories: Results of Narrow, Wide and Widest Reductionist theories as applied to a spectrum of cases. Cases.
Cases and Theories: How the various theories treat the cases.
Causal Conditions: Internal, external, reliable and unreliable, direct and indirect causes of continuity. The Causal Condition.
Which Causal Condition?
Is a Causal Condition Needed? Critique of Kolak and Martin.
Argument from Perception: The perception of enduring objects.
Neurosurgeons and the Slippery Slope: Weakening causal links, levels of abstraction, and a slippery slope argument.
Series-Persons: Parfit's argument against Nagel's same-brain criterion.
Argument by Undermining Contrary Intuitions: Why the Widest Reductionist View produces unsettling intuitions.

Ch.2: The Terminus of the Self

Bodily Death and Personal Death: Death of the biological organism and death of the person.

Two Meanings of 'Dead': Temporary and irreversible loss of life.

Permanence vs. Irreversibility: Permanent and Theoretical Death

Irreversible Cessation and Types of Continuity: Information vs function-based criteria.

Deanimate: A state apart from life and death. Distinctions between deanimate, inactivate and dormant.

Partial Death.

Declaring Death and Deanimation: Declaration as partly factual assessment, partly decision.

Practical Importance of the Deanimate Category: Effects on attitudes, status, and survival prospects.

PART 2: TRANSFORMATION, CONCERN, AND VALUE

Ch.3: A Transformationist Account of Continuity Introduction.

I. THE METAPHYSICS OF CONNECTEDNESS Measuring connectedness: The components of psychological continuity: memories, intentions, dispositions, beliefs, abilities, desires, values, projects.

II. NORMATIVE INFERENCES

Reductionism and the Depth of a Life: Is personal identity less deep on a reductionist view? Is death less significant on a reductionist view?

Transformationism: Connectedness vs. Continuity.

Disproportionality of Connectedness and Concern: Degree of concern for your future phase need not be proportional to connectedness degree: * Connectedness higher than apparent: Measures of centrality. Relative weighting of the components in terms of the types of centrality. * Intrinsically vs. instrumentally significant features.

Transformationism. * Valuing life as a whole/long stretches. * Ideal self: Changes that bring you closer to your ideal self do not reduce the degree of future concern. Difference with Taylor's view of evaluations as foundation of identity. * Holding self-transformation as a central project.

Continuity and Structuring a Life (a) Life Plans: Coherence of action & rational life plans.

(b) Principles: Incorporating principles to strengthen sticking to project. Self-definition by principles. Values & symbolism of actions. Principles as (i) Foundations: constitute/create identity; (ii) Regulators/filters: set boundaries to possible actions and identity.

Ch.4: Technological Transformation and Assimilation I. Augmentative and Deteriorative Transformation

Augmentative vs. Deteriorative Transformation.
Raymond Martin on Transformation and Replacement.

II. Integration of Change

Assimilation
Functional integration.
* Functional not structural integration; distributed existence.
* Does integration require direct control?
* Does integration require exclusive access?
* Does not require choosing the mods.
* Interdependence: Requires mutual support, feedback, homeostasis.
Enhancement vs. Supplementation
* Enhancements as assimilated abilities, supplements as external.
* Must enhancement require more effort?
* Persistence of effects.
* Chosen and imposed improvements: Ease of assimilation.
Merit in Sports, games, and tests.
* Biological: steroids, bloodpacking, nutrition, high-altitude training.
* Neurochemical: Smart drugs, mood modifiers (SSRI).
* Genetic modification.

III. Intrinsic and Instrumental Bodily Identity
* Physicalism and psychological reductionism. Bodies as means of expression.
* Instrumental importance of material and form of the body.
* Primacy of function over form.
* Level of function.
* Response to objections to rejection of intrinsic importance of bodily identity.

Conclusion The technological and social trend towards increasing self-definition.

Bibliography

ABSTRACT

The Diachronic Self: Identity, Continuity, Transformation By Max More The Diachronic Self fills out and clarifies the account of personal identity presented by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. I go on to draw metaphysical and normative consequences of this psychological reductionist theory. Some of the normative inferences disagree with those of Parfit. I examine several candidates for a necessary causal condition for personal identity or continuity and argue that we should accept one of the most liberal conditions, allowing personal identity to persist even if its cause is abnormal and unreliable. After establishing a causal condition for identity I apply psychological reductionism to critically analyze current conditions of and criteria for the death of persons. I argue that cardiac and consciousness based conceptions are incorrect. In their place I offer an information-based conception. I then go on to examine the relative importance of various psychological connections, including memories, intentions, dispositions, beliefs, desires, values, and projects. It turns out that the significance of passive elements of the self, especially memories, has often been overrated in discussions of identity.

Drawing on my metaphysical results, I draw a number of normative conclusions. I differ from Parfit in holding that reductionism does not make life less "deep" nor death less significant. I also argue that Parfit puts too much emphasis on connectedness rather than continuity when assessing the rational apportionment of future-concern. I look at the roles of an ideal self-conception, life plans, and principles in generating and sustaining concern for one's farther future self-stages. The final chapter analyses how we assimilate changes in our selves, especially physical changes resulting from technology. I distinguish augmentative from deteriorative changes, and draw normative inferences about whether rationally we should replace ourselves with a better self, if that were possible. I develop an account of assimilation in terms of functional integration, then go on to distinguish enhancement from supplementation, noting the importance of this for normative concerns. Finally, I determine the role of bodily form and function in a psychological reductionist account of personal identity.

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